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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

YOUTH TENNIS FOUNDATION
OF UTAH,
Appellant,
CASE NO, 14350

-vSTATE TAX COMMISSION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
A sales tax deficiency in the amount of $1,364.8
together with interest accruing thereon until paid, was as
sessed against the Youth Tennis Foundation of Utah based u
on its sale to the public of ticket admissions to a profes
sional tennis tournament conducted in 1973 at the Special
Event' s Center, Uni versi ty of Utah.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, Utah State Tax Commission, seeks affirmation of its decision upholding the audited sales tax
deficiency for 1973.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
References to the Transcript of Proceedings befo
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
•

-.

'•

-

1

-

" • •

the State Tax Commission are designated (TR) with page number
following.

References to the remaining record on appeal

are designated (R) with page number following.

References

to exhibits are designated (E) with the exhibit number following.

References to appellant's Brief are designated (AS)

with page number following.
The background facts set forth in appellant's Brief
are substantially correct.

However, respondent, Tax Commis-

sion, takes issue with certain factual statements set forth
in appellant's Brief as not being supported by the evidence
before the State Tax Commission.
Appellant challenges paragraph eight of the Conclusions of Law which admits that the 1973 professional tennis
tournament was similar to other tournaments conducted by the
Foundation, but, significantly, the '73 tournament charged
admissions, which none of the others had done, and, hence,
it was not a "regular" activity of the Foundation.

The refer-

ences set forth in appellant's Brief (AB-3), referring to Exhibit No. 6 and pages 25 ,26 and 43 of the Transcript of Proceedings, show no evidence that the Foundation regularly
charged admissions to professional tennis tournaments.

The

language is in the terms of "net proceeds" from the conduct
of the tournament.

The only reference having any bearing on

ticket admissions set forth in appellant's Brief (AB-3) is in
the form of a question to the witness, Mr. Freed, which is
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ambiguous on whether the net proceeds from tennis tournaments were

from player entrance fees and ticket admissions.

(TR-20,21)

The State Tax Commission, in rendering its de-

cision, relied upon testimony that tournament income from
paid admissions by the public was not regularly the way a
tennis tournament was conducted by appellants

(TR-98)

Mr. Freed, a principal in appellant, Youth Tennis Foundation,
testified in response to questions of whether the appellant
would have still shown a profit had a sales tax been paid,
as follows:
Q:

(TR-98)
In other words, if you were to pay the sales

tax as presently assessed in the amount of $1,400 odd-some
dollars, you would still show a net income for 1973; is that
correct?
A:

Yes, but you see, we testified earlier that the

pro tournament would have shown a loss of approximately $100.
The reason for that is we had other tournaments that were
profitable that we ran.
Q:

Did you pay sales tax on the other tournaments?

A:

No.

Q:

What was the source of income from the other

There were no admissions.

tournaments?
A:

Entry fees and one of them we held in Las Vegas,

the big one.

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Q:

Were you required to pay any kind of sales

or use or transaction tax for conducting the tournament
in Las Vegas, Nevada?
A:

No. (TR-98)

Appellant's references to the nature and extent
of the Foundation's income and outgo (AB-7) discloses the
revenue for the past several years (1967 to 1974)*

The

amount set forth of $12,335.48 net as proceeds from tournaments was not specifically clarified in order to determine
whether the greatest portion of those proceeds was from
entry fees paid by players and advertising commissions, or
ticket admissions purchased by the public.
Appellant correctly sets forth the facts regarding loans from the Youth Tennis Foundation to the Salt Lake
Swim and Tennis Club and to the Freed Investment Company.
It should be noted, however, that Mr. Freed testified that
loans to Freed Investment Company were made to obtain secure, safe and favorable interest income and were not in
any sense entered into for the benefit of the company.
Investment Company).

(Freed

In fact, loans were fixed at a higher

interest rate than the company would have had to pay at the
bank and are in that sense donations to the foundation.
(TR-75)

Although not brought forth in the testimony, it was

believed by the Tax Commission that said Freed Investment
-4-
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Company deducted an amount for interest payments' expense
from its corporate income tax to arrive at taxable income
for Freed Investment' Company.

This money for corporate

interest expense was not paid to any bank or savings institution but was paid to and accrued to the benefit of appellant, Youth Tennis Foundation, of which Mr. Freed was
a principal .
References in appellant's Statement of Facts
(AB-4,5) to Article XIII, Section 2, and U.C.A., Section
59-2-30 and Section 59-2-31, apply to ad valorem property
taxes and have no relevancy to sales taxes which are statutory excise taxes imposed upon the transaction of buying and
selling personal

property.

Appellant sets forth in its Brief that regarding
the conduct of the professional

tennis tournament in 1973

in question herein, thousands of free admission tickets were
provided to juniors daily.

However, appellant does not know

if any or all of said juniors attended said tournament.
(TR-111)

When questioned whether the benefit to the junior

players to see world-class tennis players would outweigh the
loss of receipts from the conduct of the 1973 tennis tournament, Mr. Freed answered

"no".

(TR-111)

Mr. Freed

previously

testified that if the sales tax is paid as questioned
the loss to the appellant from the 1973 tennis
would be $63.58.

tournament

(TR-5)
-5- .

herein,
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Other factors were considered by respondent,
Utah State Tax Commission, as having some bearing upon the
charitable nature of the conduct of the 1973 professional
tennis tournament at the University of Utah's Special Event
Center.

Appellant, Youth Tennis Foundation, had never ap-

plied for an exemption from sales and use taxes as is required by Utah law until challenged on the conduct of the
1973 tennis tournament.

(TR-96)

There was no separately

stated price for sales tax on tickets sold to the general
consuming public who bear the economic and financial burden of paying said sales tax.

(TR-96) A professional mana-

ger was hired to promote the tournament and was paid a certain
percentage of advance ticket sales and advertising commissions.

(TR-69)

Ticket income amounted to approximately

$30,801.65, upon which a tax of $1,364.84 was imposed.

(TR-5)

Appellant also testified through Mr. Freed that the Youth
Tennis Foundation bought and sold equipment for profit (net
and balls).
No. 7.

(TR-52-53)

See also Exhibit No. 6 and Exhibit

Mr. Freed also testified that loans were made to

Freed Investment Company in the following amounts:
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

$

7,500.00
7,500.00
12,500.00
4,000.00
5,500.00
10,500.00
6,965.74
6,765.74

Total

$ 61,231.48

(TR-75)
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Appellant testified that the rate of interest changed from
time-to-time, but, at the present time, it was 8 percent.
The total amount loaned to Freed Investment Company was approximately $61,231.48, at an interest rate no higher than
8 percent at any time.

(TR-75)

In 1964, appellant loaned to the Salt Lake Swim
and Tennis Club the sum of $42,500.00 for a term of 10 years
with interest at 5 percent per annum.
additional

(TR-123,23)

An

loan of $12,000.00 has been made in 1973, so that

the total loan outstanding to the Salt Lake Swim and Tennis
Club is

$54,500.00.

(TR-72)

No evidence was introduced by

appellant to suggest that at the time the loan to the Salt
Lake Swim and Tennis Club was first originated, it was so protected by an equity valued in excess of the club's obligation.

(TR-23)

In fact, appellant stated that at the time

the loan was first made in 1964, there was still doubt and
uncertainty expressed as to whether or not the then two-yearold Salt Lake Swim and Tennis Club would be profitable,
which concern lead to the purchase of insurance by appellant
for the benefit of the Salt Lake Swim and Tennis Club on
the life of David L. Freed.

(R-162)

Mr. Freed

indicated

that he, from time-to-time, served on the Board of Directors
of the Salt Lake Swim and Tennis Club.

(R-162)

It is ques-

tioned whether there was ever any arms-length transaction between appellant, Youth Tennis Foundation, and the Freed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Investment Company, in which some $61,000.00 was transferred, and the Salt Lake Swim and Tennis Club in which
some $54,500.00 was loaned.
"

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

A SALES TAX IS IMPOSED UPON ADMISSIONS TO
PLACES OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT OR RECREA_'
TION WHICH TAX IS PAID BY THE PUBLIC PURCHASING SAID TICKETS.
The principal statute in this matter is set forth
in Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-15-4, which provides:
"Excise tax~-Rate.--From and after the
effective date of this act there is levied
and there shall be collected and paid:
•k

'k -k

(d) A tax equivalent to four percent of
the amount paid for admission to any place of
amusement, entertainment or recreation.11
The above statute requires the collection and payment of
sales tax on "admissions."

This Court, in Barrett Invest-

ment Co. v. State Tax Commission, 15 Utah 2d 97, 99, 387
P.2d 998 (1964), has recognized the collection of sales tax
on sales of certain services and admissions to places of
amusement, entertainment or recreation.
In construing Utah statutes, the following rules
should apply:
"Rules of construction as to words and
phrases.--Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language; but technical
words and phrases, and such others as have
. • - 8 -
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acquired a peculiar and;appropriate meaning
in law, or are defined by statute, are to
be construed according to such peculiar and
appropriate meaning or definition."
(Utah Code Annotated, Section 68-3-11
(1953))
Where there is doubt respecting true meaning of certain
w o r d s , then words should be read in light of conditions
and necessities which they are intended to meet and object
sought to be attained thereby.

(United States Smelting,

Refining' & Milling Co. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 58 U.
168, 197 P. 902.)

Therefore, the above statute should be

read as intending to impose a sales tax upon the admission
price to any place of amusement, entertainment, or recreati on.
The administration of the sales and use tax is
vested in the State Tax Commission,

Utah Code Annotated,

Section 59-15-20, provides:
"The administration of this act is vested
in and shall be exercised by the state tax commission which may prescribe forms and rules and
regulations in conformity with this act for the
making of returns and for the ascertainment, assessment and collection of the taxes imposed her
under."
Pursuant to the above-cited authority, the Utah State Tax
Commission has adopted regulations which apply and should
have been applied by the Foundation regarding the collection and payment of sales and use tax.

The following sale

tax regulations are pertinent:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1.

S~2 provides that the nature of the sales

tax is a transaction tax imposed upon admissions to any
place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation.

The

purchaser is the actual taxpayer and the vendor is charged
only with the duty of collecting the tax from the purchaser and paying the tax to the State.
2.

S-23 provides that taxpayers who sell tangible,

personal property or related services for resale, or to
exempt customers , are required to keep records verifying
the nontaxable status of such sales.

The burden of proving

that a sale is for resale or otherwise exempt shall be upon
the person who makes the sale.
3.

(Emphasis added.)

Sales Tax Regulation S-33 provides:

"Admission defined.--The term1 admission1
means the right or privilege to enter into a
place including seats and tables reserved or
otherwise and other similar accommodations and
charges made therefor. The amount paid for the
right to use a reserved seat or any seat in an
auditorium, theatre, circus, stadium, schoolhouse,
meeting house or gymnasium to view any type of
entertainment is taxable. The right to use a
table at a night club, hotel, or roof garden
is taxable, whether such charge is designated
as a cover charge, minimum charge or any such
similar charge, and the amount paid for such right
is subject to the tax. This is true whether the
charge made for the use of the seat, table, or similar accommodation is combined with an admission
charge proper to form a single charge, or is
separate and distinct from an admission charge,
or is itself the sole charge.
"Where an original admission charge carries
the right to remain in a place, or to use a
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

seat or t a b l e , or other similar accommodation
for a 1imi ted time o n l y , and an additional
charg e is made for an extension of such t i m e , the
extra charge 1 s paid for 'admission' within the
meani ng of the law. Where a person or o r g a n i z a t i o n.acquires the sole right to use any place or
the r i ght to dispose of all the admissions to
any p lace for one or more o c c a s i o n s , the amount
paid for such right is not subject to the tax on
admi s s i o n s . S uch a transaction constitutes a
renta 1 of the entire place w h e t h e r or not it is
so de si gnated. H o w e v e r , if the person or organizati on in turn s ells admissions to the p l a c e , the.
tax w ill apply to amounts paid for such a d m i s s i on s
4.

S-34 provi des :

"Place of amusement d e f i n e d . - - T h e phrase
'place of a m u s e m e n t , e n t e r t a i n m e n t or r e c r e a t i o n '
is broad in meaning but conveys the basic idea
of a definite location. The amount paid for
admission to such a place is subject to the t a x ,
even though such charge includes the right of
the purchaser to p a r t i c i p a t e in some activity
within the place. For e x a m p l e , the sale of a
ticket for a ride upon a mechanical or self-operate
device is an admission to a place of a m u s e m e n t . "
Based upon the above-cited statutes and r e g u l a t i o n s , an
audited sales tax deficiency has been imposed against the
admission price to the professional

tennis tournament spon-

sored by the a p p e l l a n t .
POINT II
A P P E L L A N T IS NOT ENTITLED TO EXEMPTION FROM
SALES TAXES AS A C H A R I T A B L E INSTITUTION UNDER
THE FACTS WHERE THE MOTIVES OF ITS PRINCIPALS
ARE NOT FREE FROM THE TAINT OF EVERY C O N S I DERATION THAT IS P E R S O N A L , PRIVATE OR S E L F I S H .
Utah Code A n n o t a t e d , Section 5 9 - 1 5 - 6 , provides certain e x e m p t i o n s from sales tax and s t a t e s :
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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• . . and all sales made to or by religious
or charitable institutions in the conduct of the
regular religious or charitable functions and
activities; ... shall be exempt from taxation
under thi s act... ."
The general rule in the State of Utah is that the
burden is on the taxpayer claiming exemption from taxation.
11

. . . An exemption from taxation is never
presumed but must be expressly and clearly conferred in plain terms and cannot be read into
the statute. Provisions in a sales tax statute
granting exemptions from the tax thereby imposed
are to be strictly construed against the person
who claims to be exempt under such provisions,
and in favor of the taxing authority, in the absence of express legislative intent that the exemption is to be construed otherwise. All
doubts, or all reasonable doubts, are resolved
against the exemption... .,!
(68 Am.Our.2d Sales & Use Taxes, Section 11 pp.
25-26)
The initial question appears to be whether or not
the Foundation is a "charity" within the meaning of the exemption set forth in Utah

Code Annotated, Section 59-15-6.

The definition of what constitutes a "charity" is difficult.
One of the definitions suggested by the Court in Staines v.
Burton, 53 Pac. 1015 (1898), provides that charity is:
"... whatever is given for the love of
God, or for the love of your neighbor in the
Catholic and universal sense,--given from
these motives and to these ends ,--free from the
stain or taint of every consideration that is
personal, private, or selfish."
N
(At page 1011T) (Tmphasis added.)
The facts presented at the formal hearing show that,
although the Foundation is a nonprofit corporation, organized
to promote "tennis", other indirect benefits accrued to its
founders and organizers:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1.

Revenue of the Foundation has been loaned

for various personal purposes.

Loans totalling some

$61,231.48 have been loaned to the Freed Investment Company
at an interest rate not greater than 8 percent.
the interest rate was below 8 percent.

Many times

Said loans were not

really arms-length transactions, and it is doubtful

that

any demand for repayment could not be enforced when Mr.
David Freed was a principal of appellant and also a principal owner of Freed Investment Company.

If any loans to

Freed Investment Company w e r e , in fact, in excess of interest loans which could have been obtained from commercial
banks, which is doubtful, then said interest payments represented an expense item deduction on corporate income tax
returns of Freed Investment Company, although said interest
expense accrued to the benefit of the Youth Tennis Foundation of Utah, appellant herein, in which Mr. Freed is a princi pal .
2.

There were principal loans from appellant to

the Salt Lake Swim and Tennis Club, of which Mr. Freed is
also, or has been, a director, in the total amount of some
$54,000.00 at 5 percent per annum.

Again, there is doubt

as to whether this is legally enforceable as an arms-length
transact!on .
3.

One of the actual expense items of appellant

includes insurance premiums on the life of David L. Freed,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law-13Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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which expense ended in 1973.

(TR-27, 101, 102)

The reasons

for the insurance are not clear, but it was stated that, if
David L. Freed died, the loan of the appellant Foundation
to the Salt Lake Swim and Tennis Club would be paid off in
full, with all proceeds going to the Foundation, and none
to the estate of David L. Freed.

(TR-27)

It was not clear

why David L. Freed was liable for the debts of the Salt Lake
Swim and Tennis Club.
• •.':• 4 •

The Foundation maintains that it purchases

tennis equipment and balls at wholesale prices for sales
to local schools at less than retail prices; however, a
profit is made by the Foundation on said sales.

(TR-53,57)

Certain amounts of tennis equipment were purchased at wholesale and stored at the Salt Lake Swim and Tennis Club with
Mr. David L. Freed and the club manager being the only
ones having personal access to that equipment.

(TR-108,109)

But, significantly, Mr. Freed testified that he has never
personally given any of the equipment to any individual ,
junior or otherwise, nor has Mr, Fairclough, the attorney,
(TR-128)
ever

The manager of the Swim and Tennis Club has not

personally given any equipment to any youngster.

(TR-129)

Apparently, the tennis professionals are the only

ones who have made any distribution.

(TR-128)

It should also be noted that appellant never sought
an exemption from sales and use tax as a charitable organization
. -14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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until at a point in time following the 1973 professional
tennis tournament at the University of Utah's Special
Event Center when questioned by sales tax auditors.

The

above-cited U.C.A., Section 59-15-6, granting an exemption
from sales and use tax is not a self-executing

statute,

but requires that appellant file an application for exemption , -which, appell ant has failed to do until this proceeding.
Respondent takes issue with the cases cited by
appellant, dealing with ad valorem property tax laws as not
being relevant to establish an exemption from sales taxes,
which is a statutory excise tax imposed upon the transaction of buying and selling personal property.

The ad valor-

em property tax statutes impose certain governmentally

set

mill levies upon property values determined at a fixed assessment levels.

The two taxes are basically very

different,

and exemptions set forth in the Utah Constitution and general
Utah statutes are fundamentally different.

Hence, references

to property tax statutes for determining exemption are immaterial and irrelevant.
Appellant also cites many cases from other jurisdictions dealing with exemptions for charitable organizations similar to appellant's organization.

It should be

noted at the outset that there are many varying and differing statutes throughout the United States, many of which are
-15- J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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greatly dissimilar to the Utah sales and use tax statutes.
Many statutes impose gross proceeds taxes and other transaction taxes.

References by appellant to cases outside

cf the jurisdiction of the State of Utah are irrelevant
unless appellant can show similar sales and use tax statutes,
exemptions and intent in setting forth exemptions for
charitable organizations.
The above-cited facts seem to indicate that appellant utilizes its financial resources and revenue in a
manner that is not free from the stain or taint of

every

consideration that is personal, private or selfish.
POINT III
THE CONDUCT OF THE PROFESSIONAL TENNIS
TOURNAMENT CHARGING ADMISSIONS TO THE
CONSUMING PUBLIC IS NOT "REGULAR" WITHIN
THE MEANING OF U.C.A., SECTION 59-15-6.
The second aspect of the exemption set forth in
U.C.A., Section 59-15-6, provides that the charitable activities and functions must be "regular."

The conduct

of the professional tennis tournament was similar to other
tournaments conducted by the Foundation; however, significantly, the 1973 professional tournament charged admission
prices which none of the other tournaments had charged.
(TR-98)

Appellant has failed to submit any evidence or

clarify on the record before the State Tax Commission whether
other tournaments had charged admission prices to the consuming public, and, if so, how many of those tournaments
-16-J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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actually generated revenue from admissions.

The amount

of dollar income from admissions was never presented to
the State Tax Commission.
Freed, testified

In fact, appellant, through Mr.

(TR-9S) that there was no previous sales

tax on any of the tournaments, because there had been no
admissions charged.
other professional

Apparently * .appellant has sponsored
tennis tournaments and has collected

entry fees and advertising commissions.

The conduct of

the 1973 professional tennis tournament was not regular in
terms of income and receipts.

(See appellant's

Exhibit

No. 6, 1ines 5 and 6. )
In addition to the income irregularity, there were
other irregularities.

The conduct of the professional ten-

nis tournament was not regular in terms of time expended by
the principals of appellant in its promotion.
hired a professional

Appellant

promotor who was entitled to a percent-

age of advanced ticket sales and advertising, which action
appears to be profit-motivated

in nature.

"Regular" is defined by Black's Law Dictionery,
Rev. Fourth Edition, at page 1450, as:
"Steady or uniform in course practice
or occurrence; not subject to unexplained or
irrational variation. Regular is also the
antonym of 'casual' or 'occasional'."
(Palle v. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah 4 7 ,
7 P.2d 2 8 4 T
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Sales Tax Regulation S-43 provides that all sales
made to or by religious or charitable institutions in the
conduct of their ,regular religious and charitable functions
are not subject to sales tax, providing the property so sold
or purchased is to be used, consumed or sold in carrying
on the institution's regular reli gi ous or charitable purposes.
The exemption granted by the statute under this rule does
not apply to institutions merely operating upon a nonprofit
basis.

Every institution claimin g exemption under this rule

must obtain from the State Tax Commission an approval of its
claim for such exemption.. No such prior approval was obtained
by appellant.
It is hereby submitted that the 1973 professional
tennis tournament conducted by appellant was an activity not
within the regular course of the charitable activites of the
Youth Tennis Foundation as defined, such as to entitle it to
exemption from sales tax under Utah statutes and regulations.
Sales taxes should have been collected and paid on admissions
to said pro-tennis tournament.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
G. BLAINE DAVIS
Assistant Attorney General
MICHAEL L. DEAMER
Assistant Attorney General
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